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I set up in this paper an overlapping generations economy with envi-
ronment degrading itself and pollution resulting from both consumption
and production to show that there always exists an inter-temporal equi-
librium and to determine the competitive steady state. This steady state
is compared with the equilibrium steady state in the social benevolent
planner’s point of view. The paper shows the optimal ￿golden rule￿ allo-
cation which maximizes the total utility of all generations, and whenever
the capital ratio in the competitive framework is higher than the golden
rule capital ratio, the economy stands on the dynamically ine￿cient point.
The width of the ine￿cient range of capital ratio depends positively on
the environment maintaining technology and depends negatively on the
cleanness of production technology. For such any competitive economy,
I introduce some combinations of taxes and transfer with purpose of de-
centralizing the best steady state attainable through the good and factors
markets.
Keywords: overlapping generations, environmental externality, taxes
and transfer scheme.
JEL Classi￿cation: D62, E21, H21, H41
1 Introduction
Considerations on environmental externalities in the Overlapping
Generations (OLG) framework have been taken into account since
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11990s. Most studies look at the e￿ects of environment externali-
ties on dynamic ine￿ciency, productivity, health and longevity of
agents, as well as the desirable interventions of social authorities.
Most papers take into account that pollution comes from the pro-
duction process and that environment may recover or degrade itself
at a constant rate (Marini and Scaramozzino 1995; Jouvet et al 2000;
Jouvet, Pestieau and Ponthiere 2007; Pautrel 2007; GutiØrrez 2008).
However, some other researchers assume that pollution comes only
from consumption (John and Pecchenino 1994; John et al. 1995;
Ono 1996). One interesting remark from the literature is that due
to opposite assumptions in di￿erent models, the ￿ndings of e￿ects
of environmental externalities on capital accumulation are di￿erent
across papers. John et al. (1995) showed that when only consump-
tion degrades environment, the economy accumulates less capital
than what would be optimal; meanwhile GutiØrrez (2008) showed
that when production causes a higher pollution, the economy ac-
cumulates instead more capital than the optimal level. This is so
because in John et al.’s model agents have to pay taxes to maintain
environment when young, therefore an increase in pollution reduces
their saving for the future; however, in GutiØrrez’s model, higher
environmental pollution increases health costs, which are paid in
the old age, leads to agents have to save more. So the di￿erence
seems to come from when the taxes are paid (young or old?) rather
than from whether it is production or consumption that pollutes.
Another di￿erence to be noted in these two papers is their di￿er-
ent assumptions about the ability of environment to recover from
pollution. John et al. (1995) assumed that environment degrades
itself overtime meanwhile GutiØrrez assumed on the contrary that
it improves by a self-puri￿cation process. It would be interesting to
know then which di￿erence follows from which assumption.
This paper tries to disentangle the e￿ects of both production
and consumption on environment simultaneously. As in John et
al. (1994, 1995), we also assume that the environment degrades
itself over time with a constant rate and the young agents spend
an amount from their income in order to maintain environment.
Moreover, in John et al.’s papers, they assume that only the con-
sumption of old agents degrades the environment and young agents
do not consume, while in the paper of Ono (1996), he assumes con-
sumption of both young and old agents degrade the environment.
2However, in his paper, the current consumptions do not degrade
the current environment but they degrade the environment in the
next period onward. Here, we also assume that the environment is
degraded by the consumptions of both old and young agents but
we assume instead that the environment is not only degraded by
the past consumptions and production but also by the current con-
sumptions and current production. Speci￿cally, we characterize the
dynamically ine￿cient range of capital ratios in the presence of en-
vironmental externalities. Then, we shall introduce some taxes and
transfer policies that make the competitive equilibrium steady state
to be e￿cient.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the model and de￿ne the competitive equilibrium and the
competitive steady state. Section 3 presents the problem of the
social planner and de￿ne the e￿cient allocation and optimal allo-
cation; and we show the dynamically ine￿cient range of the capital
ratio in the competitive framework (proposition 1). We will compare
the competitive steady state and the social planner’s steady state in
section 4, and hence, introduce some taxes and transfer schemes to
decentralize the best steady state through goods and factor markets.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model and competitive equilibria
We consider the overlapping generations economy in Diamond
(1965) without population growth (growth rate n = 0) and nor-
malise the size of each generation to unity. Each agent in the
economy lives two periods, say young and old respectively. When
young, an agent is endowed with one unit of labor which he sup-
plies to the producing ￿rms inelastically. He divides his wage, wt,
between consumption when young ct
t, investment in maintaining en-
vironment mt, and savings kt+1 which will be consumed when old.
He supplies his savings inelastically to producing ￿rms and earns
the gross return rt+1kt+1 to consume when old, where rt+1 is the
rental rate of capital in the period t + 1. Agents born at date t




+ and the index of the environmental quality,
Et+1 2 R; which they experience when old. The preference is rep-
resented by the utility function U : R
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t+1) + (Et+1) is additively separable







Environmental quality evolves according to







 > 0 and b 2 (0;1], where F(;) is the production
function of the economy.
We assume that there is only one production sector in the econ-
omy using two factors of production as capital K and labor L.
In each period t, ￿rms produce a quantity of output Yt through




t , and capital fully depreciates each period.
In the framework of perfect competition, the representative pro￿t
maximizing ￿rm chooses Kt and Lt to maximize its pro￿t
t = Max
Kt;Lt0
F(Kt;Lt)   rtKt   wtLt
so that in each period t, the wage rate and the rental rate of capital
are determined respectively by the marginal productivity of labor
and capital. Since at equilibrium the capital Kt available at any pe-
riod t, given population is normalized at 1, is the previous aggregate
savings kt and aggregate labor is Lt, then the wage rate and rental
rate of capital that the agent living in period t and t + 1 faces are
rt+1 = FK(Kt+1;Lt+1) = FK(kt+1;1) = Ak
 1
t+1 (1)
wt = FL(Kt;Lt) = FL(kt;1) = (1   )Ak

t (2)
Without human activity, the environmental quality will converge
autonomously to the level of zero and the depreciation rate b mea-




t+1) are the degradations of the environment quality
resulting from production and consumption, respectively. The term

mt measures environmental improvement from the action of young
agents at period t. One can thus interpret environmental quality
as the cleanness of rivers and atmosphere, and the quality of soil or
groundwater, etc. It is also the quality of parks, gardens and zoos
4which themselves depreciate and also require maintenance. One ex-
ample for an output of good that both producing it and consuming
it degrade the environment is wood. People produce wood by cut-
ting trees in the forests degrading the environment. If wood is used
to maintain the parks or zoos then the environment is improved.
But if consumed as fuel (for heating or domestic uses), then the
environment will be polluted. Since we normalize the size of each
generation to unity and know that the savings of agent born in the
period t are used as capital for production in period t + 1, then the
evolution of the environmental quality can be represented by the
following expression






where F(kt+1;1) is the production function per capital in period
t + 1.
Formally, the life-time utility maximization problem of the rep-

















t + kt+1 + mt (4)
c
t
t+1 = rt+1kt+1 (5)














for given values of Et 1, c
t 1
t , kt, mt 1, wt as well as the expected
consumption of the young agent, c
t+1;e
t+1 , and the rate of capital re-
turn, rt+1, in the period t + 1. We assume that this agent is one
of the many members of generation t and therefore his savings are
5very small compared to the aggregate savings of the economy as a
whole. As a consequence, he ignores the impact on the aggregate
capital of the economy from his own savings. This assumption im-
plies that he does not internalize the impact of his savings have on
the environment via production. The ￿rst order conditions (FOCs)
















t+1) = 0 (9)
which relate the marginal utilities of consumptions with marginal
utility of environmental quality. The optimal choice of the agent, 
ct
t; ct
t+1; kt+1; mt; Et; Ee
t+1
	
, is a function of Et 1, c
t 1
t , kt, mt 1,
c
t+1;e
t+1 , and rt+1 implicitly de￿ned by the system of equations
c
t
t + kt+1 + mt   wt = 0 (10)
c
t
t+1   rt+1kt+1 = 0 (11)




t )   
mt 1 = 0 (12)
E
e



























t+1) = 0 (15)
as long as the Jacobian matrix of the left-hand-side of the system
above with respect to ct
t; ct
t+1; kt+1; mt; Et; Ee
t+1 is regular at the
solution. The regularity of the associated Jacobian matrix will be
veri￿ed at the equilibrium in Appendix A1.
In order to guarantee the FOCs are not only necessary but su￿-
cient for the solution to be a maximum, we have check the second
order conditions (SOCs) which are represented in the Appendix A2.
62.1 Competitive equilibrium
The perfect foresight competitive equilibrium allocations are char-
acterized by the agent maximizing utility under these budget con-
straints holding correct expectations, the dynamics of environment,
and the determinants of the factors’ prices. In other words, they are
the solution to the following system of equations
c
t
t + kt+1 + mt   FL(kt;1) = 0 (16)
c
t
t+1   FK(kt+1;1)kt+1 = 0 (17)
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(1   b) + 
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0(Et+1) = 0 (20)
The existence of perfect foresight competitive equilibrium follows
under the conditions guaranteeing the regularity of the associated
Jacobian matrix with respect to c
t+1
t+1; ct
t+1; kt+1; mt; Et+1 of the left
hand side of the system of equations above (see Appendix A.1).
At the competitive equilibrium, the two conditions (1) and (2)
holding in every period, the agent’s budget constraints (16) and
(17) guarantee the feasibility of the allocation of resources. Since in
any period t, adding up the budget constraints of the young agent,
ct








t + kt+1 + mt = FK(kt;1)kt + FL(kt;1) = F(kt;1)
The competitive equilibrium allocation can also be completely
characterized by the dynamics of the per capita savings and the
dynamics of the per capita investment in environment which result
from the agent’s utility maximization and the determinations of fac-
tor prices.
72.2 Competitive equilibrium steady state
A perfect foresight competitive equilibrium steady state of this over-
lapping generations economy is a constant sequence fk; mg charac-
terized by
u
0 (FL(k;1)   k   m) =
























the consumptions c0; c1 and environmental quality index E at
the steady state being determined by
c0 = FL(k;1)   k   m (23)
c1 = FK(k;1)k (24)
E =
(
 + )m   ( + )F(k;1) + k
b
(25)
3. E￿cient allocation and optimal allocation
In this section, we consider the e￿cient allocation from the benev-
olent social planner’s point of view. The social planner allocates
resources in order to maximize the welfare of both current gener-
ation and all future generations. Any allocation selected by her
is optimal in the Pareto sense (see Blandchard and Fisher 1989,
chapter 3, pp 91 - 104). We will ￿nd the e￿cient allocations and
the optimal allocation by solving the dynamic optimization problem
below. Assume that the current period is t = 0, given k0; E0; c
 1
0 ,












(1 + R)t+1 (26)





t + kt+1 + mt (27)






where R  0 is the subjective discount rate of the social planner.
The discount rate R is strictly positive when she cares more about
the current generation than about the future generations, while R
equals to zero when she cares about all generations equally. The ￿rst
constraint (27) of the problem is the resource constraint of the econ-
omy in period t, requiring that the total output is allocated to the
consumptions of the young and the old, to savings for the next pe-
riod’s capital stock, and to environmental maintenance. The second
constraint (28) is the dynamics of the environmental quality. Solv-
ing the problem of the social planner is presented in the Appendix
A3.
At the steady state, the FOCs for the social planer’s problem can




(1 + R) + (1 + R)2
b + R





 + (1 + R)
b + R

0(  E) (30)
FK( k;1) =
1 + R
1   (1 + R)=

(31)
The equations of resource constraint and the environmental qual-
ity index become
F( k;1) =  c0 +  c1 +  k +  m (32)
 E =
(
 + ) m   ( + )F( k;1) +  k
b
(33)
The e￿cient steady state of this overlapping generations economy
can be determined by a constant sequence

 c0; c1; k;  m;  E
	
through
solving the system of ￿ve equations from (29) to (33).
9For the case the social planner cares all generation equally, R = 0,
the capital ratio at the steady state is the so-called golden rule level
of capital per capita. Substituting R = 0 into the equations of e￿-








































 + )m   ( + )F(k;1) + k
b
(38)
(We assume that 
 >  which ensures FK(k;1) > 0, otherwise the
evironment would degrade without bound, this seems to be unreal-
istic)
Diamond (1965) shows that in the standard OLG model with-
out pollution externalities, an economy whose stationary capital
per worker exceeds the golden rule level is dynamically ine￿cient.
GutiØrrez (2008) shows that, in an economy, if the pollution exter-
nality is large enough then there are always e￿cient capital ratios
that exceed the golden rule capital ratio. She shows the existence
of a super golden rule level of capital ratio, beyond the golden rule
level, and such that any economy with pollution externalities whose
stationary capital ratio exceeds this level is dynamically ine￿cient.
Some notes that should be considered are that: (i) she takes into ac-
count pollution externalities from production; (ii) the environment
recovers itself overtime at a constant rate; (iii) there is no resource
devoted to maintain the environment; (iv) the pollution externality
decreases the utility of the agents indirectly by requiring each agent
to pay an amount for health cost in the old-age period. In this pa-
per, we consider instead an economy without population growth and
pollution externalities coming from both production and consump-
10tion; the environment degrade itself over time and there is always
an amount devoted to maintain the environment. The quality of en-
vironment a￿ects directly the utility of the agents. In contract with
GutiØrrez (2008), this paper shows thus that in an economy with
pollution externality and without population growth, the golden
rule capital ratio is the highest level of capital ratio that is dynami-
cally e￿cient. This conclusion is accordance with the conclusion of
Diamond (1965) for the standard OLG model.
Proposition 1: In any economy with environmental externalities
in which the pollution cleaning technology dominates the pollution
marginal e￿ect of production (i:e: 
 > ), the golden rule capital
ratio is the highest level that is dynamically e￿cient.
Proof:
We know that the e￿cient capital ratio is implicitly de￿ned to
be a function of R by the condition
FK( k(R);1) =
1 + R


























So,  k is decreasing in R. Hence,  k is maximal as R = 0, that is
exactly the golden rule level of capital. Therefore,  kmax = k

We have shown in Proposition 1 that any economy with a capital
ratio exceeds k is dynamically ine￿cient. It is obvious from (36)
that k is decreasing in the production pollution parameter . It is,
however, increasing in the environment maintaining technology 
.
Hence, economies with more environmental problems coming from
11production have a larger range of dynamically ine￿cient allocations.
However, the cleaner the environment maintaining technology is, the
smaller range of the dynamically ine￿cient allocations is.
From (34) and (35), the marginal utility of consumption of the
young agent must equal that of the consumption of the old agent.
The golden rule steady state of this overlapping generations economy
is characterized a constant sequence fc
0; c
1; k; m; Eg solving the
system from (34) to (38)
4. Tax Schemes
We have found that a steady state competitive equilibrium is dy-
namically ine￿cient when the capital ratio exceeds the golden rule
ratio. In this section, we examine how to implement tax and/or
transfer policies in order to achieve the optimal allocation in the
long run for economies whose competitive equilibrium is dynami-
cally ine￿cient. Ono (1996) and GutiØrrez (2008) introduced some
taxes and transfer schemes to decentralize the ￿rst best steady state
in the context of pollution externalities. However, their schemes may
only hold when the economy already is at the ￿rst best steady state.
In other words, when the economy is at the ￿rst best steady state
at some point of time their taxes and transfer policies will help to
uphold this state. Nevertheless, one question should be addressed is
that ￿which policy we can use to help the economy reaching the ￿rst
best steady state through competitive markets in the transition?￿ . In
this section we will introduce taxation schemes to help the economy
reach the e￿cient steady state (for the ￿rst best steady state, we
just set the social planner’s discount rate R = 0) in the transition
and will stay there after reaching the e￿cient steady state onward.
In this paper, such the e￿cient steady state will be called the best
steady state and the corresponding e￿cient capital ratio is called
the best capital ratio. The ￿rst best steady state implies the best
steady state with R = 0. The common strategy of these schemes can
be distinguished between two stages. The ￿rst stage is the process
of transition. In this stage, we choose taxes and transfer such that
the capital ratio is always chosen by the agent at the optimal ratio
from the social planner’s point of view. This stage ￿nishes when the
economy converges to a steady state. I will prove that, this steady
state completely coincides with the centralized steady state. In the
12second stage, these schemes will be continuously applied to uphold
the steady state. I will present two stages of the ￿rst scheme care-
fully to make the idea easy to follow. Other schemes have similar
procedures.
4.1. Taxes on consumptions
Suppose that after ￿nishing the period t 1, the economy is reaching
the competitive steady state. The social planner needs a tax and
transfer scheme to help the economy to go a pathway reaching the
best steady state (for given R). This scheme must guarantee that
the capital ratio and consumption in period t+1 of the agent born in
period t always equal to the best steady state capital ratio and the
best steady state consumption of the old. Following Ono (1996),
consumption taxes are considered. The tax rate of consumption
imposed on the young is 0c which may be di￿erent from the tax
rate of consumption imposed on the old, 1c. I also introduce t to
be a lump-sum tax levied on the income of the young at date t, and
t+1 to be a lump-sum transfer to the agent when he will be old at
date t + 1. Under this tax system, the problem of an agent born at

















t + kt+1 + mt = wt   t (43)
(1 + 1c)c
t
t+1 = rt+1kt+1 + t+1 (44)














Note that in equation (46), F(kt+1;1) is replaced with yt+1 imply-
ing that the agent ignores the e￿ect of his savings on the aggregate
output. So the agent does not optimizes with respect to kt+1 here.
13At an equilibrium, the wage rate and capital return will be set at
the productivities of labor and capital, respectively. In addition, at
a perfect foresight equilibrium the perfect foresight environmental
quality is exactly its real value, Ee
t+1 = Et+1. Hence, the ￿rst-order



















By comparing two pairs of equations (47) & (29) and (48) & (30),
and considering the best captial ratio given by FK( k;1) = 1+R
1 (1+R)=
,









 (1+R)) 1. These tax rates can be kept unchanged
over time. Note that the best steady steady is characterized by
f c0;  c1;  k;  m;  Eg. At the best steady state, if it can be attained
by implementing taxes and transfer scheme, the lump-sum tax and
lump-sum transfer are set to constants   = FL( k;1)   (1 +  0c) c0  
 k    m and   = (1 +  1c) c1   FK( k;1) k, respectively. Obviously, at
the best steady state the taxes and transfer scheme guarantees the
budget to be balanced, i.e.   =  0c c0+ 1c c1+ . We now show that,
with tax rates on consumptions above, in any period t there always
exists a lump-sum tax, t, imposed on the income of the young in
the period t and lump-sum transfer, t+1, to the old in the period
t+1 to ensure that the capital ratio and consumption of the agent,
when he old, will be chosen at  k and  c1, respectively, by the agent.
In e￿ect, for given Et 1, c
t 1
t , kt, mt 1, wt, c
t+1;e
t+1 and the best capital
ratio  k and best consumption  c1, let fct
t; mt; t; t+1; Et; Et+1g be
a solution to the following system of equations
(1 +  0c)c
t
t +  k + mt + t   FL(kt;1) = 0 (49)








mt 1 = 0 (51)
14Et+1   (1   b)Et + F( k;1) + (c
t+1;e
t+1 +  c1)   




t)   [(1   b) + 
(1 +  0c)]










0(Et+1) = 0 (54)
Equations (49) and (50) come from the budget constraints of the
agent with lump-sum tax and lump-sum transfer. Equations (51)
and (52) are evolutions of environment. Note that in the equation




t +  0cct
t +t
since the old receives a transfer which is exactly equal to what the
young agent pays,  0cct
t +t, to keep the government’s budget to be
balanced. Equations (53) and (54) are derived from the ￿rst-order
conditions. The existence of a solution is veri￿ed by the regular-
ity of the following associated Jacobian matrix J1 with respect to
ct
t; mt; t; t+1; Et; Et+1.
J1 =
0
B B B B B
@
1 +  0c 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0  1 0 0
(1 +  0c) 0  0 1 0
0  
 0 0 b   1 1
u00(ct
t) 0 0 0 0 G1
0 0 0 0 0 H1
1
C C C C
C
A
with G1 =  [(1   b) + 








The existence of a lum-sump tax t and lump-sump transfer t+1 is
stated in the proposition 2.
Proposition 2: For an overlapping generations economy set up
above, in any period of the transition process, there always exists
consumption taxes, lump-sum tax and transfer scheme to attain the
best capital (saving) ratio  k and best consumption  c1 through com-
petitive markets.
Proof: See Appendix A4.
Note that this scheme of taxes and transfer is merely imple-
mentable. In order to implement this scheme precisely, at the be-
ginning of period t, the social planner has to solve the system of
15equations (49)-(54) given what she knows from the previous pe-
riod {Et 1, c
t 1
t , kt, mt 1}, the perfect foresight consumption of the
young in the period t + 1, c
t+1;e
t+1 , the wage rate wt known from la-
bor market, and consumption tax rates  0c;  1c, which she set at the
beginning of period t, as well as the best capital ratio  k and best
consumption  c1 which she is targeting. By solving this system, she
will know ct
t; mt; t; t+1; Et; Et+1 simultaneously. After solving the
system she will announce the scheme f 0c;  1c; t; t+1g, which has
just computed, to the agents. Given this scheme, the agent will
behave optimally as the social planner desires.
Proposition 3 will state the taxes and transfer scheme that from
the period t+1 onward the government’s budget will still be always
kept balanced and the period t + 1 is a stepping-stone for economy
to achieve the permanent best steady state.
Proposition 3: After ￿nishing period t (the ￿rst stage of taxation),
the economy can achieve the best steady state from period t + 1 on-
ward by implementing the following combination
 0c =
 + (1   b)(






 +    b)
(b + R)(
   (1 + R))
  1 (56)
  = FL( k;1)   (1 +  0c) c0    k    m (57)
  =  0c c0 +  1c c1 +   (58)
At such the steady state the government’s budget is kept balanced
every period.
Proof: See Appendix A5.
4.2. Taxes on consumption and capital income
In the section 4.1, we introduced taxes on consumptions in which
the tax rates are di￿erent between consumptions of the old and the
young. In the reality, however, this tax scheme seems to be di￿cult
to apply because it may violate the equity among generations. In
16order to avoid the discrimination between the old and the young,
an unique rate of consumption tax c should be applied. Beside
that, a capital income tax k and a system of lump-sum tax t and
lump-sum transfer t+1 are introduced to show that the best steady
state allocation can be achieved. We can also show that the social
planner is able to design such the taxes and transfer policy ensuring
the government’s budget to be balanced. Under this tax system, the










t+1) + (Et+1) (59)
subject to
FL(kt;1)   t = (1 + c)c
t
t + kt+1 + mt (60)
(1 + c)c
t
t+1 = (1   k)FK(kt;1)kt+1 + t+1 (61)














In equation (63), F(kt+1;1) is replaced with yt+1 implying that
the agent ignores the e￿ect of his savings on the aggregate output
and, therefore, he does not optimizes with respect to kt+1 here. At
an equilibrium, the wage rate and capital return will be set at the
productivities of labor and capital, respectively. In addition, at
a perfect foresight equilibrium the perfect foresight environmental
quality is exactly its real value, Ee
t+1 = Et+1. Hence, the ￿rst-order
condition for this problem can be written as
u0(ct
t) = [(1   b) + 










With the same procedures and argument to section 4.1, by com-
paring two pairs of equations (64) & (29) and (65) & (30), and con-
sider the best captial ratio given by FK( k;1) = 1+R
1 (1+R)=
, the con-
17sumption tax rate and capital income tax rate should be set to con-









respectively. With these tax rates, there always exists a lump-sum
tax, t, imposed on the income of the young in the period t and
lump-sum transfer, t+1, to the old in the period t+1 to guarantee
the capital ratio and consumption of the agent, when he old, to be
chosen at  k and  c1, respectively, by the agent. In e￿ect, for given
Et 1, c
t 1
t , kt, mt 1, wt, c
t+1;e
t+1 and the best capital ratio  k and best
consumption  c1, let fct
t; mt; t; t+1; Et; Et+1g be a solution to the
following system of equations
(1 +  c)ct
t +  k + mt + t   FL(kt;1) = 0 (66)
(1 +  c) c1   (1    k)FK( k;1) k   t+1 = 0 (67)
Et   (1   b)Et 1 + F(kt;1) + (ct
t + c
t 1
t +  cct
t + t)   
mt 1 = 0 (68)
Et+1   (1   b)Et + F( k;1) + (c
t+1;e
t+1 +  c1)   
mt = 0 (69)
u0(ct
t)   [(1   b) + 





(1 +  c)
(1   k)FK( k;1)

0(Et+2) = 0 (71)
The existence of a lump-sump tax and lump-sump transfer scheme
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where G2 =  [(1   b) + 








0. The existence of a lum-sump tax t and lump-sump transfer t+1
is stated in the proposition 4.
18Proposition 4: For an overlapping generations economy set up
above, in any period of the transition process, there always exists
consumption taxes, capital income tax, lump-sum tax and transfer
scheme to attain the best capital (saving) ratio  k and best consump-
tion  c1 through competitive markets.
Proof: See Appendix A4.
Similar to previous scheme, this scheme is merely implementable.
Proposition 5 states that from the period t + 1 onward the govern-
ment’s budget will still be always kept balanced and the period
t+1 is a stepping-stone for economy to achieve the permanent best
steady state in the period t + 2 onward.
Proposition 5: After ￿nishing period t (the ￿rst stage of taxation),
the economy can achieve the best steady state from period t + 1 on-
ward by implementing the following combination
 c =
 + (1   b)(




 k = 1  
(b + R)(
   (1 + R))(1 +  c)
(1 + R)(
 +    b)
(73)
  = FL( k;1)   (1 +  c) c0    k    m (74)
  =  c( c0 +  c1) +  kFK( k;1) k +   (75)
At such the steady state the goverment’s budget is kept balanced
every period.
Proof: See Appendix A5.
4.3 Taxes on consumption and production
We still keep the non-discriminatory tax rate c on consumptions
and the system of lump-sum tax t and lump-sum transfer t+1. We
now introduce a Pigouvian tax on production. In any period, let p
be the tax paid by ￿rms per one unit of output produced. We also
show that in this scenario the social planner is able to design taxes
and transfer policy keeping the government’s budget to be balanced
19and achieving the best allocation through competitive market. The
balanced budget implies t+1 = c(ct
t + ct
t+1) + pF(kt+1;1) + t.
The problem that the ￿rms must solve is
Max
kt
(1   p)F(kt;1)   rtkt   wt (76)
The return of capital and the return of labor are
rt = (1   p)FK(kt;1) (77)
wt = (1   p)FL(kt;1) (78)
Under this tax scheme, the problem in the equilibrium of an agent










t+1) + (Et+1) (79)
subject to
FL(kt;1)   t = (1 + c)c
t
t + kt+1 + mt (80)
(1 + c)c
t
t+1 = (1   p)FK(kt+1;1)kt+1 + t+1 (81)














In equation (83), F(kt+1;1) is replaced with yt+1 implying that
the agent ignores the e￿ect of his savings on the aggregate output
and, therefore, he does not optimizes with respect to kt+1 here. At an
equilibrium, the wage rate and capital return will be set at the pro-
ductivities of labor and capital, respectively. In addition, at a per-
fect foresight equilibrium the perfect foresight environmental quality
is exactly its real value, Ee
t+1 = Et+1. With the same procedures and
argument to section 4.1, the consumption tax rate and production









+ b) , respectively. With these tax, there al-
ways exists a lump-sum tax imposed on the income of the young to
guarantee that the capital ratio and consumption in the old period
will be chosen at  k and  c by the agent, respectively. In e￿ect, for
given Et 1, c
t 1
t , kt, mt 1, wt, c
t+1;e
t+1 and the best capital ratio  k and
best consumption  c1, let fct
t; mt; t; t+1; Et; Et+1g be a solution to
the following system of equations
(1 +  c)ct
t +  k + mt + t   FL(kt;1) = 0 (84)
(1 +  c) c1   (1    p)FK( k;1) k   t+1 = 0 (85)
Et   (1   b)Et 1 + F(kt;1) + (ct
t + c
t 1
t +  cct
t + t)   
mt 1 = 0 (86)
Et+1   (1   b)Et + F( k;1) + (c
t+1;e
t+1 +  c1)   
mt = 0 (87)
u0(ct
t)   [(1   b) + 





(1 +  c)
(1   p)FK( k;1)

0(Et+2) = 0 (89)
The existence of a lump-sum tax and lump-sum transfer scheme
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where G3 =  [(1   b) + 








0. The existence of a lump-sum tax t and lump-sum transfer t+1
is stated in the proposition 6.
21Proposition 6: For an overlapping generations economy set up
above, in any period of the transition process, there always exists
consumption tax, production tax, lump-sum tax and transfer scheme
to attain the best capital (saving) ratio  k and best consumption  c1
through competitive markets.
Proof: See Appendix A4.
This scheme is merely implementable. Proposition 7 states that
from the period t + 1 onward the government’s budget will still be
always kept balanced and the period t + 1 is a stepping-stone for
economy to achieve the permanent best steady state in the period
t + 2 onward.
Proposition 7: After ￿nishing period t (the ￿rst stage of taxation),
the economy can achieve the best steady state from period t + 1 on-
ward by implementing the following combination
 c =
 + (1   b)(




 p = 1  
(b + R)(
   (1 + R))(1 +  c)
(1 + R)(
 +    b)
(91)
  = (1    p)FL( k;1)    c c0    k    m (92)
  =  c( c0 +  c1) +  pF( k;1) +   (93)
At such the steady state the goverment’s budget is kept balanced
every period.
Proof: See Appendix A5.
4.4 Taxes on consumption, production and labor income
We now modify the tax and transfer policy introduced in section
4.3 by using the labor income tax rate w to replace the lump-sum
tax on wage. All other things are kept the same in the section 4.3.















t+1) + (Et+1) (94)
subject to
(1   wt)FL(kt;1) = (1 + c)c
t
t + kt+1 + mt (95)
(1 + c)c
t
t+1 = FK(kt+1;1)kt+1 + t+1 (96)




t ) + 
mt 1 (97)






In equation (98), F(kt+1;1) is replaced with yt+1 implying that
the agent ignores the e￿ect of his savings on the aggregate output
and, therefore, he does not optimizes with respect to kt+1 here. At an
equilibrium, the wage rate and capital return will be set at the pro-
ductivities of labor and capital, respectively. In addition, at a per-
fect foresight equilibrium the perfect foresight environmental quality
is exactly its real value, Ee
t+1 = Et+1. With the same procedures and
argument to section 4.1, the consumption tax rate and production









+ b) , respectively. With these tax, there al-
ways exists a labor income tax imposed on the income of the young
in period t and a lumpsum transfer to the old in period t + 1 to
guarantee that the capital ratio and consumption in the old period
will be chosen at  k and  c by the agent, respectively. In e￿ect, for
given Et 1, c
t 1
t , kt, mt 1, wt, c
t+1;e
t+1 and the best capital ratio  k and
best consumption  c1, let fct
t; mt; wt; t+1; Et; Et+1g be a solution
to the following system of equations
(1 +  c)ct
t +  k + mt   (1   wt)FL(kt;1) = 0 (99)






mt 1 = 0 (101)
23Et+1   (1   b)Et + F( k;1) + (c
t+1;e
t+1 +  c1)   
mt = 0 (102)
u0(ct
t)   [(1   b) + 





(1 +  c)
(1   p)FK( k;1)

0(Et+2) = 0 (104)
The existence of a labor income tax and lump-sum transfer scheme







1 +  c 1 FL( k;1) 0 0 0
0 0 0  1 0 0
(1 +  c) 0 FL( k;1) 0 1 0
0  
 0 0 b   1 1
u00(c
t 1
t 1) 0 0 0 0 G4





where G4 =  [(1   b) + 








0. The existence of a labor income tax wt and lump-sum transfer
t+1 is stated in the proposition 8.
Proposition 8: For an overlapping generations economy set up
above, in any period of the transition process, there always exists
consumption tax, production tax, labor income tax and lump-sum
transfer scheme to attain the best capital (saving) ratio  k and best
consumption  c1 through competitive markets.
Proof: See Appendix A4.
Proposition 9 states that from the period t + 1 onward the gov-
ernment’s budget will still be always kept balanced and the period
t+1 is a stepping-stone for economy to achieve the permanent best
steady state in the period t + 2 onward.
Proposition 9: After ￿nishing period t (the ￿rst stage of taxation),
the economy can achieve the best steady state from period t + 1 on-
ward by implementing the following combination
 c =
 + (1   b)(




24 p = 1  
(b + R)(
   (1 + R))(1 +  c)
(1 + R)(
 +    b)
(106)
 w = 1  
(1 +  c) c0 +  k +  m
(1    p)FL( k;1)
(107)
  =  w(1    p)FL( k;1) +  c( c0 +  c1) +  pFK( k;1) (108)
At such the steady state the goverment’s budget is kept balanced
every period.
Proof: See Appendix A5.
5 Conclusion
I have presented a general equilibrium overlapping generations model
with environmental externalities in which I combined two strains in
the literature that the environment is polluted by both production
and consumption. For such a model I proved that there exists a
competitive equilibrium and then I determined a competitive steady
state. This steady state was compared with the best steady state in
the social planner’s point of view. The pollution externality coming
from consumption does not a￿ect the dynamically ine￿cient range
of capital ratio meanwhile the pollution externality coming from pro-
duction does. The higher the production pollution parameter , the
larger the ine￿cient range. The environmental maintaining technol-
ogy 
 also plays a role in determining the best steady state capital
ratio  k. The cleaner the environment maintaining technology, the
smaller range of the dynamically ine￿cient allocations.
By comparing the competitive steady state and the best steady
state, I designed some balanced budget taxes and transfer schemes to
decentralize the best steady state. These schemes consist two stages.
The ￿rst stage is the transition process in which the taxes and trans-
fer schemes help the economy to go a pathway reaching the best
steady state. In the second stage, taxes and transfer schemes will
uphold the economy always being at the best steady state. I showed
that the taxes and transfer schemes are merely implementable if at
the beginning of each period the social planner announces the values
of taxes and transfer.
25This paper simpli￿ed many things such as the technology is ex-
ogenous, the population growth rate is zero and there is only one
production sector, which may be far from the reality. So, there are
still many complicated and interesting aspects should be taken into
account, which requires to develop the model, in which endogenous
technology, endogenous fertility, and the role of human capital ac-
cumulation, etc. are still on my research agenda.
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26Appendix
A1. Checking for the existence of competitive equilibrium
From the FOCs of the problem of the representative agent and the
set of constraints, we have a system de￿ning (c
t+1
t+1; ct
t+1; kt+1; mt; Et+1)
as a function of (ct
t; c
t 1
t ; kt; mt 1; Et):
c
t
t + kt+1 + mt   FL(kt;1) = 0 (109)
c
t
t+1   FK(kt+1;1)kt+1 = 0 (110)









t)   [(1   b) + 
]












0(Et+1) = 0 (113)
The non-singularity of the associated Jacobian matrix derived
from the system of implicit function guarantees the existence of the
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where







K(kt+1;1) 0(Et+1) < 0










We apply the Laplace’s expansion to compute the determinant
of the Jacobian matrix. Hence,
27det(J) =
  
    
 
0 0 1 1 0
0 1  C 0 0
  FK(kt+1;1)  
 1
0 0 0 0 G
0 v00(ct
t+1) D 0 H
  




    
 
0 0 1 1
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Therefore, the associated Jacobian matrix J is non-singular. This
implies there exists a competitive equilibrium, and the dynamics



































A2. Checking the SOCs for the maximization problem of
the agent
In order the FOCs to be su￿cient conditions for them to characterize
a (local) maximum to the optimization problem, we have to check
the SOCs from the following maximization problem
Z = u(ct
t) + v(ct
t+1) + (Et+1) + 1(ct




Et   (1   b)Et 1 + F(kt;1) + (ct
t + c
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 b   1 1
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The properties of SOEs guarantees the solution of the agent is a
maximal.
A3. Solving the problem of the social planner
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(1 + R)t+1  
t

(1 + R)t+1 = 0 (120)
At the steady state,
u
































1   (1 + R)=

31A4. Proof of proposition 2, proposition 4, proposition 6,
proposition 8
It is clearly to ￿nd that, the associated Jacobian matrixes J1, J2
and J3 are similar. The matrix J4 is nearly the same to others.
However, by following the same steps presented below to veri￿ed
the regularity of J1, then the regularity of J4 will be also veri￿ed
easily. So, it su￿ces to prove proposition 2 only. The remaining
others could be proved completely in the same way.









 (1+R)) 1. Now, I show the existence of the lump-sum
tax and and hence lump-sum is de￿ned by showing the regularity of
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t)[(1   b) + 
] > 0
Hence, J1 is regular .
A5. Proofs for proposition 3, proposition 5, proposition 7,
proposition 9
The proofs for proposition 3, proposition 5, proposition 7, proposi-
tion 9 have similar ideas and procedures. It su￿ces to prove propo-
sition 3 only.
Proof for proposition 3
I show that from the period t+1 onward the government’s budget
will still be always kept balanced and the period t+1 is a stepping-
stone for economy to achieve permanently the best steady state in
32the period t + 2 onward. In e￿ect, equations (54) and (30) imply
Et+1 =  E, and then (53) and (29) imply ct
t =  c0. The system of
equations to determine the lump-sum tax and lump-sum transfer
for the agent born in period t + 1 becomes
(1 +  0c)c
t+1
t+1 +  k + mt+1 + t+1   FL( k;1) = 0 (121)
(1 +  1c) c1   FK( k;1) k   t+2 = 0 (122)
Et+1(=  E) = (1   b)Et   F( k;1)   (c
t+1
t+1 +  c1) + 
mt (123)
Et+2   (1   b)Et+1 + F( k;1) + (c
t+2;e
t+2 +  c1)   




t+1)   [(1   b) + 
(1 +  0c)]










0(Et+2) = 0 (126)
The existence of fc
t+1
t+1; mt+1; t+1; t+2; Et+1; Et+2g is veri￿ed
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Again, equation (30) and (126) imply Et+2 =  E, then at a perfect




t+1 =  c0. It is





t+2 =  c0 holds. Hence, equation (124) implies
mt+1 =  m. Substituting c
t+1
t+1 =  c0, mt+1 =  m into (121) we have
t+1 =  . And t+1 =   =  0c c0 +  1c c1 +   =  0cc
t+1
t+1 +  1c c1 + t+1
implies that the government’s budget in period t + 1 is balanced.
Moreover, the economy achieves the best steady state in period t+1.
From period t + 2 onward the balanced taxes and transfer scheme
f 0c;  1c;  ;  g will be implemented to uphold the best steady state
permanently. 
33